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ABSTRACT 
 
It is usually assumed that the appraisal of the impacts experienced by present 
generations does not entail any difficulty. However, this is not true. Moreover, there is 
not a widely accepted methodology for taking these impacts into account. Some of the 
controversial issues are: the appropriate value for the discount rate, the choice of the units 
for expressing the impacts, physical or monetary units —income, consumption or 
investment— and the valuation of tangible and intangible goods. When approaching the 
problem of very long term impacts, there is also the problem of valuing the impacts 
experienced by future generations, through e.g., the use of an intergenerational discount 
rate. However, if this were the case, the present generation perspective would prevail, as 
if all the property rights on the resources were owned by them. Therefore, the 
sustainability requirement should also be incorporated into the analysis. We will analyze 
these problems in this article and show some possible solutions. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Reviewing the literature on project evaluation it might be thought that, if all the impacts 
of a project affected present generations, then there would not be any difficulty in the 
evaluation of any project from a social perspective. However, the reality is quite different. 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1951) and the theorems of Gibbard (1973) and 
Satterthwaite (1975) show that, given a group of alternatives, it is not possible to arrange 
them or find the best choice from a social perspective if a minimum of logical properties is 
required to the result. This is a general result and affects any way of making social choices, 
including market and voting systems. In short, it is obvious that there is not any available 
procedure for public project evaluation—and it is not possible to design it—free of 
paradoxical results.  
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Therefore, there is not a completely satisfactory system for public project evaluation. We 
are neither able to find a procedure superior to all the others. As a consequence, there have 
appeared numerous methods, which respond to different approaches, have different logical 
properties and tackle with greater or lower success different difficulties. 
There is an obvious conclusion: it will be preferable one or other system depending on 
the specific case to solve and on the objective pursued. For example, Osborne and Turner 
(2007) conclude: "We find that a referendum leads to higher welfare than a cost benefit 
analyses in “common value” environments. Cost benefit analysis is better in “private value” 
environments".  
Leaving aside the purely qualitative methods, there are several quantitative evaluation 
procedures incorporating in an explicit or implicit way a relative prices system. Not all of 
them are acceptable. Remer and Nieto (1995) present 25 quantitative procedures for 
measuring the desirability of a project, although most of them are not advisable at all. Twenty 
of them can be rejected because of their lack of rationality. Some give the same weight to 
impacts occurring in different moments of time, obviating the need for time discounting. 
Other methods compute costs and benefits following accounting criteria that, such as 
amortization or the imputation of general expenses, contradict the basic economic notions of 
cost and benefit. For any selected method it is necessary: a- identifying the relevant costs and 
benefits, b.- quantifying them; c- valuing them and d- weighting the impacts according to the 
moment they happen. Two problems will be examined below: time discounting and 
sustainability. 
 
 
2. THE PROBLEM OF DISCOUNTING 
 
Let us assume that, such as in Cost-Benefit Analysis, it is possible to quantify and 
valuing all the impacts in all the years of a project. The aggregation of the flows in each year 
t, t = 0, 1, …, T, is done by means of the well-known Net Present Value function: 
0
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where r is the social discount rate. The NPV is a profitability measure in absolute terms. 
It measures the change of wealth in year 0 that is equivalent to undertake the project. Given 
at, the function depends on the value given to the social discount rate r. 
Before we tackle the controversial problem of choosing the appropriate methodology for 
determining the discount rate, it is necessary to decide whether we follow methodological 
individualism or, following a paternalistic approach, decide the discount rate value 
independently of individual preferences. 
In any case, the discount rate r, can represent a- the social time discount rate STDR, b- 
the social opportunity cost of capital, or c- the minimum profitability that the decision maker 
expects to achieve in order to undertake the project. In ideal conditions both will lead to the 
same value for r. However, in practice, the result will substantially differ according to the 
methodology which is followed. 
The time preference rate of an individual might include various factors: consumption 
impatience, survival probability, and the decreasing marginal utility of consumption if the 
individual expects having an increased consumption over time. However, it might be argued 
that discounting for impatience is not rational, and that individuals die, but not society, so 
these components should not be taken into account. In this case the STDR would be very low, 
around 0.5%, while if all the relevant factors at individual level are taken into account, this 
rate might be around 5%. 
The opportunity cost of capital approach is not an easier way because there are very 
different alternatives. 1- The interest rate of capital markets. 2- The relative profit of the 
economy computed as the ratio between total benefit and capital stock. But this is an average 
value and we are looking for the marginal one. Moreover, there are definition and 
measurement problems with profit and capital stocks, especially in the public sector. Values 
around 20% are normal. 3- The marginal productivity of capital computed by means of the 
production function of the economy. This is a more rigorous method than the previous one, 
and gives similar values. 
Other interesting approach is the shadow price of investment (SPI). The SPI computes the 
present value of the flows generated by a unit of investment with a rate of profitability q 
during a time T, which are discounted through the STDR. In its simple formulation it results: 
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It is assumed that part of project flows is allocated to consumption and the rest is 
allocated to investment. The discounting of the flows is undertaken by multiplying the funds 
allocated to investment by the SPI. 
The problem is choosing the most appropriate model for determining the shadow price of 
investment. As Souto (2002) shows, the result of the SPI computation is very sensible to the 
hypothesis of each model with respect to the duration of the investment and to the 
consideration of reinvestment possibility. In such a way that the SPI might be infinite, 2.5, 1.2 
or -7.1 for the same project according to the model employed. 
Paradoxically, the computation of the SPI does not use to include the so-called marginal 
cost of public funds (MCF). The MCF measures the marginal costs of the inefficiency caused 
in the economy when collecting funds by means of taxes or other distortionary instruments—
see figure 2. There are also competing methodologies for the measurement of these costs—
see Triest (1990) and Liu (2003)—and none of them is superior to the others, which makes 
more difficult their application. Obviating this component involves undervaluing the 
necessary costs for undertaking an investment. Actually, the MCF is much higher than the 
average cost, is roughly 0.2 per collected unit, and might achieve the high value of 0.5, which 
is the result of Sancho (2003)—see an example in Annex I. Moreover, administration and 
compliance costs should also be added to this welfare cost. It is not necessary to highlight that 
the debate on the MCF is not less important than the one on the STDR, with regard to its 
possible impact on the result of the measurement of the desirability of a public project. 
After reviewing the issue, there is a clear conclusion: there is not consensus, not only on 
the best way of computing the appropriate discount rate, but also with respect to the factors 
that this rate should include. Consequently, it is not unusual the choice of a third way: directly 
choosing a reasonable value. Then, it would be convenient to achieve an agreement on which 
is the discount rate value to be applied in public project evaluation. However, there is not a 
unique notion of reasonable rate, so that it might happen that one public agency employed a 
discount rate of 3% while other public agency employed a discount rate of 12% for evaluating 
the same project. This happens in the real world, especially in international cooperation 
projects. This lack of consensus might lead to paradoxical results, as we show below. 
Let A and B be two different agencies that apply rA = 3% and rB = 12% discount rates 
respectively. They have to evaluate projects I and II—see Figure 1. Under these conditions, it 
might happen that NPV (r
B
I
A) > NPV (rII A) but NPV (rI BB) < NPVII(rB) so that agency A would 
choose project I and agency B would choose project II—see Figure 1. Of course, r
B
A and rBB 
values correspond to rates applied in real world valuation of public projects. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
3. THE PROBLEM OF SUSTAINABILITY 
 
With all its limitations, the conventional discount rate r shows the preferences of an 
individual on the availability of a good or resource today versus tomorrow. Under the 
immortality hypothesis—which is implicitly done in the conventional computation of the 
NPV—it is relatively easy to aggregate individual discount rates in order to get a social 
discount rate. But it is not possible to get an efficient result by means of this approach, 
because it does not take into account the preferences between own and descendants’ 
consumption, or in other words, between present generations (PG) and future generations 
(FG). The result is a systematic bias in the NPV computation, which undervalues costs and 
benefits that occur in what is called long term—in human terms. The most important bias 
arises in the evaluation of the impacts that do not affect PG but have much importance for 
FG. 
The problem when computing long term impacts is clear. With a discount rate of r = 5% 
the Net Present Value (NPV) of $ 1,000,000 in 100 years is lower than $ 8,000. However, for 
the generations that will live in 100 years, the impact will be $ 1,000,000, ceteris paribus and, 
in any case, 100 years is an insignificant lapse of time for the planet. In the limit, PG would 
measure the value of a catastrophe for FG as a little cost that can be compensated with a small 
benefit. With the purpose of avoiding this kind of results, several proposals have been made. 
The most straightforward proposal is extremely simple. If the problem worsens as the 
discount rate increases, then it might be solved employing a zero discount rate or might be 
alleviated with a sufficiently low rate—see Daly and Cobb (1989) among many others. A 
zero discount rate involves a practical problem: all the projects yielding a positive flow of net 
benefits for an unlimited time would lead to an infinite value for the profitability 
computation—unless the time scope is limited to a finite and arbitrarily low one. But this 
proposal also has serious conceptual problems. It is an ad hoc solution, because the discount 
rate is a data, a parameter, and not a decision variable. The rate which represents the 
preferences between present and future consumption of a generation is arbitrarily modified. 
Moreover, although the proposal is justified because it favors future generations, it does no 
take into account citizens’ preferences between own and descendants’ consumption. 
There is a more appealing proposal, the proposal of a decreasing discounting over time. 
Heal (1997) suggests that a discount rate decreasing in a logarithmic way over time would be 
more appropriate than a constant rate. Weitzman (2001) proposes a similar approach: 
hyperbolic discounting. Weitzman starts from a survey in which the next question was asked 
“(…) what real interest rate do you think should be used to discount over time (expected) 
benefits and (expected) costs of projects being proposed to mitigate the possible effects of 
global climate change?”. The data obtained fitted a gamma function, and in this way “even if 
everyone relieves in a constant discount rate, the effective discount rate declines strongly over 
time” - Table 1.  
 
Table 1. "Approximate Recommended" Sliding-Scale Discount Rates 
Period of years 1–5 6–25 26–75 76–300 > 300 
Discount rate 4% 3% 2% 1% 0% 
Source: Weitzman (2001). 
 
The formal analysis is appropriate. However, some economic objections might be done: 
 
a- The question mixes the costs—which are tangible and are pure private goods—with the 
benefits—which are intangible and are a pure public good in the Samuelson sense. 
Actually, environmental costs and benefits should be discounted through a different rate 
than the appropriate one for market goods (see Almansa and Calatrava, 2007). 
b- It might be thought that the same data would adjust other functions and, under this 
hypothesis, the result would have been qualitative different. 
c- It might be questioned if it had not been preferable asking directly about the appropriate 
rate for each period of time, without imposing the restriction of a constant rate. 
However, the result is reasonable and appealing. Actually, the proposal, with small 
variations in values and intervals, is included in Treasury (2003)—Table 2. 
 
Table 2. The Declining Long Term Discount Data 
Period of years 0–30 31–75 76–125 126–200 201–300 > 300 
Discount rate 3.5% 3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 
   Source: Treasury, http://greenbook.treasury.gov.uk/ 
 
The result alleviates the loss of importance of a very long term cost or benefit which 
would result from the application of a conventional rate. A hyperbolic rate of discount has 
also the advantage of simplicity. Therefore, it has clear virtues when comparing it with other 
more soundly based methods. 
However, there is a serious criticism; it would be too daring to state that one hyperbolic 
rate is able to show two different preferences: time preferences with regard to citizens’ own 
consumption and preferences on intergenerational allocation. The result is that the application 
of one rate cannot be efficient as far as it ignores, completely or partially, citizens’ 
preferences and intergenerational externalities. 
The problem, correctly exposed, consists in accounting and weighting the costs and 
benefits of a project in a model with overlapped generations, which is a relatively new and 
complex approach. First, it is necessary to take into account the conventional rate r, which 
shows the preferences of an individual between present and future consumption. Second, it is 
necessary to explicitly incorporate other rate R, which represents the preferences between 
own and descendants’ consumption. 
Kula (1988) determines the profitability of a project for each generation through the 
computation of the NPV with the conventional discount rate. These NPVs are aggregated 
giving the same weight to all generations. That is to say, with a zero intergenerational rate. 
Several authors, such as Collard (1981), Bellinger (1991), Pasqual (1999), Sumaila and 
Walters (2005) and Almansa and Calatrava (2007), among others, propose the use of two 
rates—r for computing each NPV and R for aggregating them—or what might be equivalent, 
the conventional rate r and an intergenerational weighting. 
Therefore, there is a good theoretical basis for computing the costs and benefits of a 
project which affects several generations. But there is an applied problem, as there is still not 
a reasonable estimation of intergenerational weights (or discount rates), or of their order of 
magnitude. 
The solution to the issue exposed above is only part of the problem. It might improve 
efficiency, but only consists in taking into account present generations’ preferences. Thus, it 
might imply acting as if future generations had not any right. The use of two discount rates—
intragenerational and intergenerational—might be appropriate, but does not guarantee the 
fulfillment of the sustainability requirement. 
Padilla (2002) and Pasqual and Souto (2003), among others, highlight that, in order to 
fulfill the sustainability requirement, it is necessary to employ other instruments. There is not 
enough with the use of economic tools, it is also necessary to employ political mechanisms 
and to develop institutional innovations and reforms. The basic problem is simple, present 
generations (PG) have much and varied tools for passing on their preferences to future 
generations (FG), but the same does not happen in the inverse way. FG cannot communicate 
with PG and do not have any possibility of negotiating with PG. Then, FG will find the 
resources voluntarily legated by PG. 
Each one of the successive PG acts according to the least efficient economic regime—the 
open access one—with respect to the following generations. Thus, it might be foreseeable a 
collapse of the system in a relatively brief period. However, this prediction would not be 
much realistic as it ignores important factors that act in opposite sense. As far as PG have 
well defined preferences on the welfare of FG—and there are the appropriate institutions—it 
would be possible that the behavior of PG led to a sustainable result. 
Sustainable development might be defined as the “development that meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”, 
WCED (1987). Let be Rjg the initial resources of type j that are available for generation g, 
which has population Ng. These resources might be exploited by generation g with a rate of 
return kg, obtaining (1+kg)·Rjg. Let Cg and cg, cg = Cg/ Ng, be the total and average needs of 
resource j for generation g, with Cg = hg(1+k)·Rjg, h∈ℜ+. In the same way, the following 
generation g+1 will obtain resources Rjg+1 = [(1-hg)(1+kg)(1+kg+1)·Rjg] and per capita 
resources rjg+1 = [(1-hg)(1+kg)(1+kg+1)·Rjg]/Ng. Sustainability with respect to the use of 
resource j by generations g and g+1 would be obtained if: 
hg ≤1 and Cg+1/ Ng+1 ≤ [(1-hg)(1+kg)(1+kg+1)·Rjg]/Ng  (3) 
If hg >1, then the generation g needs exceed the resources available for them and it would 
not be sustainable for present generation g. The result, in terms of the size of the populations 
of g and g+1, depends on whether these needs are the subsistence ones or exceed this 
biological limit. If hg ≤ 1, then sustainability for generation g is achieved. Sustainability for 
generation g+1 would be more feasible the lower the populations (Ng and Ng+1) and the needs 
(cg and cg+1) and the greater the resources productivities (kg and kg+1). 
If the conditions in (3) were widely fulfilled, then it would not be necessary to continue 
the analysis. It might be though that a path leading to this goal is being followed. The 
arguments for sustaining such opinion would be several and important changes that are 
happening. One of these changes is green national accounting. This consists in adjusting 
conventional accounting systems with the aim of properly including all the—tangible and 
intangible—costs and benefits in national accounting (Ahmad, Serafy, and Lutz, 1989). In 
this way the generation of wealth will not be mixed up with the simple transformation of 
natural capital (KN) into manufactured capital (KM)—Figure 2. 
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In moment t = 0 there are KN units of natural capital and KM units of manufactured capital. 
In the following period t =1, KM has considerably increased, although the reduction of natural 
capital KN is even greater. There has been a loss that green accounting would take into account 
while conventional accounting would interpret as spectacular growth. 
Figure 2 
 
Among the changes experienced, one might also highlight innovations and improvements 
in the methodology for the design of projects with great environmental impact. As an 
example, the concept of habitat equivalency analysis (HEA)—see Dunford, Ginn and 
Desvousges (2004) and Zafonte and Hampton (2007)—is attractive and relevant, both from a 
theoretical and from an applied perspective. The HEA procedure aims to compensate in terms 
of present value for the environmental damages in a habitat. The complete repairing of a 
damaged habitat would not be sufficient compensation: as a consequence of considering time 
discounting, in order to maintain the value of 1 unit lost today it is necessary to get (1+r) units 
tomorrow. In order to compute the compensation, the units that have been repaired and their 
relative value are taken into account, as well as the quantity of equivalent habitat that has 
been produced. 
It is important to highlight that the compensation for an environmental impact by means 
of the HEA is undertaken with exactly the same kind of natural resources. This would avoid 
some logical problems, such as the Scitovsky reversal paradox (Scitovsky, 1941), as well as 
ethical ones, which might appear when monetary compensations are used.  
Project evaluation methods have also been adapted to the new requirements of 
environmental quality—see e.g., EBRD (2006). These methods overcome the possibilities of 
classical procedures, such as Cost-Benefit Analysis. Among the new evaluation 
methodologies, the so-called social multi-criteria evaluation (Munda, 1996 and 2004) stands 
out due to its potentiality and flexibility. 
It could not be denied that both the changes in the design of projects and the appearance 
of modern evaluation systems for taking into account environmental variables have more 
relevance for FG than for PG. The same might be said about much of the policies undertaken 
by governments that, such as some of the policies for mitigating climate change, are more 
favorable to FG than to PG. 
From a less optimistic—or more exigent—perspective the current evolution of methods 
and policies appears as clearly insufficient. It might be thought that there is still much to be 
done and that it is urgent to pursue environmental sustainability as a top-priority goal and to 
determine specific lines of action. In the words of Goodland, Daly and Serafy (1993):  
 
“Environmental sustainability can be approached by implementing four priorities: first, by using 
sound microeconomic means; second, by using sound macroeconomics to differentiate between use and 
liquidation of natural capital by means by environmental accounting; third, by using environmental 
assessment to incorporate environmental costs into project appraisal; and fourth - until the first three 
become fully achieved - by following operational guidelines for sustainability”. 
 
It might be not enough with correctly incorporating the preferences and the point of view 
of PG. It might be necessary to explicitly admit that PG do not have all the property rights on 
the Earth but that, at least in part, these rights also belong to FG. Under this hypothesis the 
goal is to advance in the design of new institutions with the aim of representing and defending 
the interests and rights of FG. 
Actually, any PG has the capacity of modifying and abolishing institutions, laws and 
norms. For this reason, it is necessary to build up a protecting network before the formulation 
of any reform proposal in favor of the interests of FG. In short, this might start with a 
constitutional amendment in order to difficult the derogation of legal dispositions to be 
established in favor of FG. Protected natural spaces would be a typical example. 
Of course, in order to protect a maritime zone placed in international waters an 
international agreement would be necessary. The same applies for an appropriate 
management of strategic resources and of some residuals. The solution implies the creation of 
specialized international agencies, such as a World bank of natural and environmental 
resources and an International bank of radioactive residuals. 
Besides legal protection, the market incentives might also be used. Fiscal incentives 
might be used by entities and foundations whose goal was the purchase of natural spaces for 
their effective preservation. 
Last, it would be useful to create the figure of the FG representative. The goal of this 
agency would be monitoring the use of the resource wealth belonging to FG. In case of 
conflict, it would claim in markets and in front of the administration or political system an 
adequate compensation. 
 
Annex I. The Marginal Cost of Public Funds. An Example. 
 
Let C’ = 20 be the marginal cost of production of a consumption good and p = 100 – 20X 
the inverse demand function—see Figure 3. A perfect market would lead to an allocation of 
X0 = 4 with a price po = 20. 
If X was charged with a specific production tax T = 10, then the quantity would be X1 = 
3.5, and consumer price would be p1 = 30 while producer price will remain at p0. Tax 
collection would be R1 = (p1 – p0)X1 = 35,  (area ?+? in the figure). The inefficiency caused 
by the price distortion, measured through the excess burden, is W1 = (X0 – X1)·(p1 – p0)/2 = 
2.5, (area ?) while the excess burden per unit of collected resources would be w1 = W/R1 = 
7.14 %. 
Let us assume that the tax is increased by 10% for financing a project. The tax is now T’ 
= 11 and the new equilibrium is X2 = 3.45, p2 = 31, while the producer price remains at p0. 
Tax collection increases to R2 = (p2 – p0)X2 = 37.95 (area ?+? in the figure) and the excess 
burden is now W2 = (X0 – X2)·(p2 – p0)/2 = 3.025, (area ?+?+?) which in the next 
percentage of total tax collection, w2 = W/R2 = 7.97 %. 
The result of the 10% increase in the tax T charged on good X leads to an increase in 
collection by ΔR = 2.95, (area ?-? in the figure) with the corresponding excess burden 
increase ΔW = 0.75, (area ?+?). The marginal cost of public funds is then MCF = 
ΔW/ΔR = 25.42 %, (area [?+?]/[?-?]). 
C’
C’ + T
C’ + T + ΔT
X0X1X2
? ? ?
? ?
p0
p1
p2
MCF = (?+?)/(?-?)
The Marginal Cost of Public Funds (MCF)
X(p)
 
Figure 3 
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